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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1795 
___________ 
 
SANG GOO PARK, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
THE UNITED STATES,  
                            Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A097-848-626) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2017) 
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David K. S. Kim, Esq. 
Law Office of David K. S. Kim, P.C.  
193-08 Northern Boulevard 
Flushing, NY 11358 
 
Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Claire Workman, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
Counsel for Respondent 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Petitioner Sang Goo Park, a citizen of South Korea, 
was ordered removed in 2009, in part for submitting 
fraudulent documents in support of his visa application.  He 
now claims that, in the years since the removal order, he has 
become eligible for a “§ 212(i)” waiver of inadmissibility.  
He would like the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or 
“Board”) to reopen his removal proceedings so that he might 
apply for the waiver, but he faces an imposing obstacle.  
Because of the passage of time, his only route to reopening 
lies through 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), commonly known as the 
“sua sponte” reopening provision.  Under that regulation, the 
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BIA may reopen a case at any time.  The BIA has held, 
however, that it will do so only in extraordinary 
circumstances.  As a result, the BIA’s discretion in this area is 
broad—so broad, in fact, that we have no meaningful way to 
review it, thereby depriving us of jurisdiction over orders 
denying sua sponte reopening. 
Park’s petition invokes one of the limited exceptions to 
the rule against review.  He argues, as he did before the 
agency, that the BIA has consistently reopened sua sponte for 
aliens like him who have become eligible for relief from 
removal after their cases have ended.  By ruling consistently 
in this way, Park contends, the BIA has established a rule or 
“settled course of adjudication” that it is now bound to 
follow, or at least from which the BIA may not depart without 
explaining itself.  Park also points to our two precedential 
opinions interpreting this “settled course” exception, 
Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. and Cruz v. Att’y Gen.,1 as weighing 
in favor of our ability to review the BIA’s decision. 
  Park’s petition gives us an opportunity to clarify our 
jurisprudence surrounding the “settled course” exception, 
which originated over a decade ago but has existed since 
without a framework.  In part, this requires us to interpret 
Chehazeh and Cruz, which Park reads as being broader than 
they actually are (a mistake he is not alone in making). 
Under the “settled course” framework we establish 
below, Park neither shows nor allows us to reasonably infer 
that the BIA has constrained its discretion in a way that would 
allow our review of its decision denying sua sponte 
reopening.  His other arguments in favor of exercising 
                                                 
1 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012); 452 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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jurisdiction are unavailing.  Thus, we will dismiss his petition 
for lack of jurisdiction.  
I. Background 
a) Entry, Accusations of Fraud, and Immigration 
Removal Proceedings 
Park entered the United States on a visitor’s visa in 
1999.2  Some years later, he applied for an adjustment of 
status based on an approved immigrant petition from his 
employer.  During the adjustment process, authorities 
discovered that Park, a cook, had said on his visa application 
that he had been employed at an electronics company—a 
falsehood.  Charged with being inadmissible due to fraud 
(which he contested) and for overstaying the visa (which he 
conceded), Park insisted that he was unaware of the 
information in the application that misstated his employment.  
Park did not otherwise apply for relief from removal; at the 
time, he was not eligible for a § 212(i) waiver of 
inadmissibility because he lacked a qualifying relative.3   
In the end, the presiding Immigration Judge sustained 
the fraud charge and ordered Park deported to South Korea.  
The BIA dismissed his appeal, and we denied his petition for 
review.4   
                                                 
2 Park’s immigration case was originally consolidated with 
his wife’s and child’s, but as Park is our only petitioner, we 
will focus on him alone for simplicity’s sake.   
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1).  
4 See Park v. Att’y Gen., 371 F. App’x 343, 345 (3d Cir. 
2010) (per curiam). 
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About two and a half years later, Park filed his first 
BIA motion requesting sua sponte reopening.  Through new 
counsel, Park argued, in essence, that apparent 
inconsistencies in his testimony about whether he had signed 
the visa documents were due to a flawed translation from 
Korean into English.  The BIA declined to reopen Park’s 
case, and we dismissed his second petition for review for lack 
of jurisdiction.5   
b) Park’s Second, Current Motion to Reopen Sua 
Sponte 
This brings us to the present.  In January 2016, Park 
filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings sua 
sponte, this one premised on his new eligibility for a § 212(i) 
waiver of inadmissibility.  He asserted that his parents, now 
permanent residents of the United States (and, thus, potential 
qualifying relatives for the waiver), would suffer great 
hardship if he were removed.  Park explained that they reside 
near him in New Jersey, depend on him financially, and 
suffer from mental distress (such as depression and even 
suicidal ideation) associated with his immigration situation.  
Tying these threads together, he argued in his motion that the 
BIA “has generally reopened proceedings sua sponte and 
remanded to the IJ, where . . . [an alien] became eligible for 
relief from removal subsequent to the final order of removal, 
and/or either the DHS does not oppose the motion or other 
positive factors” are present, citing a series of unpublished 
BIA cases in support.6   
                                                 
5 See Park v. Att’y Gen., 560 F. App’x 154, 155–57 (3d Cir. 
2014) (per curiam). 
6 Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 22. 
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The BIA denied Park’s motion in a short decision.  
After noting that Park had already filed the one motion to 
reopen authorized by law and had otherwise filed beyond the 
applicable deadline, the BIA briefly addressed sua sponte 
reopening: “Based on the totality of circumstances presented, 
we do not find . . . an exceptional situation that would warrant 
the Board’s exercise of its discretion to reopen sua sponte.”7  
c) Park’s Current Petition for Review 
In his petition, Park argues primarily that the BIA has 
impermissibly departed from a consistent pattern of 
administrative decisions rendered in similar cases.  Through 
this settled course and pattern, he argues, the BIA has 
constrained its discretion such that we may exercise 
jurisdiction and review it for abuse.  To support this route to 
our jurisdiction, he relies again on a series of unpublished 
BIA cases, about ten in all—although not the same decisions 
he relied on before the Board.   
Park also raises secondary but related arguments for 
how we might properly find jurisdiction.  For instance, he 
reads our opinions in Chehazeh8 and Cruz9—the two prior 
precedential opinions in which we invoked the “settled 
course” exception—as granting us jurisdiction over orders 
denying sua sponte reopening for lack of exceptional 
situations or circumstances.  Park asks us to find, once we 
have asserted jurisdiction, that the BIA’s decision was an 
abuse of its broad discretion, and to “remand to the Board 
with instructions to reopen the proceedings” so that his 
                                                 
7 A.R. 3. 
8 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012). 
9 452 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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eligibility for the § 212(i) waiver can be fully considered.10   
II. Legal Background of Sua Sponte Reopening11 
We begin with a quick summary of the statutory and 
regulatory scheme and then move to a discussion of sua 
sponte reopening.  Since we have not previously developed a 
framework to guide the “settled course” exception, we do so 
below.  
a) Motions to Reopen in the BIA; Our Jurisdiction in 
General 
An alien has the right under statute and regulation to 
file a single motion to reopen his or her removal proceedings, 
subject to certain limitations (and exceptions to those 
limitations) that are not relevant here.12  We ordinarily have 
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of such a motion, 
conducting a “highly deferential” review for abuse of 
discretion; the BIA’s decision is not disturbed unless found to 
                                                 
10 Park Br. 29.   
11 What follows is primarily about our jurisdiction in the 
context of sua sponte reopening.  Yet Park ultimately wants a 
§ 212(i) waiver of inadmissibility, and we generally lack 
jurisdiction to review agency decisions regarding a § 212(i) 
waiver.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i)(2), 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  
Because the agency never addressed the discretionary merits 
of Park’s request for a waiver, it is likely that our jurisdiction 
here (if otherwise found to exist) would be unaffected.  See 
Mazariegos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 280, 285 (1st Cir. 2015).   
12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Prestol 
Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 215–17 (3d Cir. 2011).   
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be “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”13  As always, we 
are limited in our review to “the rationale that the agency 
provides.”14   
b) The BIA May Reopen Sua Sponte in Extraordinary 
Circumstances 
Section 1003.2(a) of the immigration regulations 
contains a catch-all provision not found in the statute: even 
when an alien might otherwise be ineligible to reopen his or 
her case, the BIA may nevertheless “at any time reopen or 
reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has 
rendered a decision.”  Because the regulation speaks of the 
BIA acting “on its own motion,” this catch-all is known as 
sua sponte reopening—although since an alien usually has to 
ask the BIA to act, and in a written request at that, the label is 
technically inapt.15   
Section 1003.2(a) does not say what standard the BIA 
is to apply in deciding sua sponte requests to reopen.  Rather, 
it says simply that decisions are “within the discretion of the 
Board,” which has the discretion to deny a motion “even if 
the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.”  
In interpreting the scope of its authority under this regulation 
and its predecessor, the BIA has clarified that it will exercise 
its discretion to reopen “sparingly” and in “exceptional 
                                                 
13 Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2011).   
14 Konan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005). 
15 See Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 
2013) (“A request for sua sponte reopening is an oxymoron, 
but the odd concept seems to be well entrenched in 
immigration law.”).   
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situations” only, and will not use sua sponte reopening as a 
“general remedy for any hardships created by enforcement of 
the time and number limits in the motions regulations.”16  
However, while the BIA “must be persuaded that the . . . 
situation is truly exceptional before [it] will intervene,”17 the 
presence of an exceptional situation does not compel it to act; 
the BIA may still decide against reopening.18   
c) Because the BIA’s Discretion is Near Absolute, We 
Generally Lack Jurisdiction to Review Its Decisions 
Denying Sua Sponte Reopening 
Over a decade ago, in Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft,19 we 
held that orders by the BIA declining to exercise its discretion 
to reopen sua sponte are functionally unreviewable, unlike 
other orders on immigration motions to reopen.  Relying on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney,20 we 
explained that because the BIA’s discretion is essentially 
unlimited, we lacked a “meaningful standard . . . against 
which to judge the [BIA’s] exercise of [its] discretion.”21  
Under the teachings of Heckler, this left us unable to exercise 
jurisdiction despite the general presumption in favor of 
judicial review of agency decisions.22  Other courts have 
                                                 
16 In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (BIA 1999).   
17 Id. at 1134. 
18 See Cruz, 452 F.3d at 249; Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 
1158 (9th Cir. 2002). 
19 320 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2003). 
20 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
21 Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 474 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. 
at 830). 
22 Id. at 474–75.   
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reached substantially the same conclusion.23  
d) Development of Exceptions to the Rule Against 
Review 
We have developed two exceptions to our rule against 
review, and while Park invokes only one directly, discussion 
of both helps to illuminate the kinds of decisions we have and 
have not ruled to be within our jurisdiction.   
 1) The First Exception: We Can Review the 
BIA’s Reliance on an Incorrect Legal 
Premise 
The first exception arises when the BIA relies on an 
incorrect legal premise in denying a motion to reopen sua 
sponte.  In Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., we held that we may exercise 
jurisdiction in those cases and remand to the BIA so that it 
may exercise its sua sponte authority under the correct legal 
framework.24     
 2) The Second Exception: We Can Review the 
BIA’s Decision When the BIA Has 
                                                 
23 See Peralta v. Holder, 567 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(collecting cases); Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1004 
(8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam) (collecting cases).  The 
Supreme Court has declined to reach the question.  See 
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251 n.18 (2010).  
24 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011).  As the Ninth Circuit 
recently observed, “no circuit squarely presented with this 
issue has held to the contrary,” although the Eighth has 
“expressed some skepticism.”  Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 
575, 589 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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Constrained Its Discretion through Rule or 
Settled Course of  Adjudication 
  i) The Origin of the Exception 
The roots of the second exception are found in Calle-
Vujiles itself.  In the midst of discussing our lack of 
jurisdiction in that case, we wrote: “It is true that if an agency 
announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of 
adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise of 
discretion will be governed, that exercise may be reviewed 
for abuse.”25  In so stating, we were borrowing secondhand 
from the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in INS v. Yang,26 in 
which the Court explained—in the context of the BIA’s 
denial of a waiver—that unfettered agency discretion could 
be narrowed by settled practice to the point where an 
irrational departure from that practice might constitute 
abuse.27   
Although Calle-Vujiles recognized the possibility of an 
exception, our observation there was simply an aside.  There 
was no “settled practice” argued by the parties and, as a 
result, we did not say anything more about this possible 
exception to our rule against review, such as what might 
                                                 
25 Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 475 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  We note that Calle-Vujiles is generally 
cited by other courts for its proscription on jurisdiction, not its 
recognition of an exception.  See, e.g., Barry v. Mukasey, 524 
F.3d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 2008); Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 
518 (2d Cir. 2006). 
26 519 U.S. 26 (1996). 
27 See id. at 31–32.   
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suffice to invoke it.   
  ii) We Reaffirm the Settled Course 
Exception in Chehazeh and Cruz  
Despite its origin in dicta, the “settled course” 
exception to the rule against sua sponte review has twice 
arisen in precedential opinions since Calle-Vujiles, both times 
in complex cases where it was far from the only moving part.  
While neither decision sets out a precise framework for how 
to evaluate the presence of a “settled course,” the opinions are 
nevertheless instructive on what kinds of BIA decisions we 
have found to be within our ambit of review.  Moreover, both 
opinions reaffirm the basic principle recognized in Calle-
Vujiles: we have jurisdiction if the BIA’s discretion is 
bounded.28   
In the more-recent of the two cases, Chehazeh v. Att’y 
Gen.,29 we recognized that while the BIA’s discretion to deny 
sua sponte reopening was indeed unfettered, its discretion to 
grant reopening—which it did in Chehazeh to the detriment 
of the alien—was not.  “[B]ecause the BIA has announced 
                                                 
28 This principle is a natural corollary to the general 
presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action.  
See, e.g., Kucana, 558 U.S. at 251–52 (discussing the 
presumption); Jahjaga v. Att’y Gen., 512 F.3d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 
2008) (same). 
29 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012).  Chehazeh arose not from a 
petition for review, but from an Administrative Procedure Act 
challenge.  See id. at 121.  The different posture of Chehazeh 
does not appear to be a point of distinction, at least for our 
decision today.   
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and followed a general policy that it will exercise its 
discretion to reopen only in exceptional situations,” we wrote, 
“we may review a decision to reopen to determine whether it 
was based upon an exceptional situation.”30   
In the earlier of the two cases, Cruz v. Att’y Gen.,31 the 
BIA’s order denying reopening failed to mention that the 
alien’s criminal conviction, which was the sole ground of 
removability, had been vacated.  Instead, the BIA summarily 
denied reopening as time-barred and found sua sponte action 
unwarranted “for any reason.”32  Observing that both our 
precedent and the BIA’s own precedent suggested that 
petitioner Cruz was no longer removable, we decided in part 
that the BIA’s cursory order left the basis for its decision 
unclear.  Had the BIA in fact considered and rejected Cruz’s 
arguments or had it done something entirely different?  As we 
can review only the rationale the BIA provides for its 
decision, this ambiguity created an untenable “jurisdictional 
conundrum.”33  Although we did not ultimately decide 
whether the BIA actually had established a general policy of 
reopening in cases like Cruz’s, we found jurisdiction and 
remanded for the BIA to at least “explain logically its 
unwillingness to” reopen Cruz’s case.34 
                                                 
30 Id. at 129. 
31 452 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2006). 
32 Id. at 244–45. 
33 See id. at 248–50.   
34 Id. at 250. 
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  iii) Our Nonprecedential Cases 
Inconsistently Apply the Settled Course 
Exception 
While Chehazeh and Cruz are our sole precedential 
cases dealing with the settled course exception,35 our 
nonprecedential cases have addressed it several times.  Those 
decisions inconsistently locate the moment where a 
petitioner’s allegation of a settled course of conduct suffices 
to transform an unreviewable BIA sua sponte decision into a 
reviewable one.  The majority of them consider the sources 
identified by the petitioner before deciding whether the BIA 
has constrained its discretion and, thus, whether we have 
jurisdiction.36  In others, however, we have suggested that the 
allegation of a pattern or settled course is itself sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction.37 
                                                 
35 We appear to be the only Court of Appeals to recognize in 
a precedential decision a possible “settled course” exception 
in the context of sua sponte reopening.  But see Tamenut, 521 
F.3d at 1005 (citing to Calle-Vujiles and assuming, without 
deciding, that “a settled course of adjudication could establish 
a meaningful standard by which to measure the agency’s 
future exercise of discretion”). 
36 See, e.g., Lora-Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 632 F. App’x 678, 
680 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Dwumaah v. Att’y Gen., 628 
F. App’x 121, 124 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Zhou v. Att’y 
Gen., 429 F. App’x 120, 123 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
37 See, e.g., Codner v. Att’y Gen., No. 16-1411, 2016 WL 
4717941, at *2–3 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2016) (per curiam); Sapon-
Caniz v. Att’y Gen., 502 F. App’x 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam). 
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e) Creating a Framework For the Settled Course 
Exception 
We hold today that the approach taken by the majority 
of our nonprecedential cases is the correct one to follow, and 
informs the proper framework to use in “settled course” 
cases.  It is our view that in order to invoke the “settled 
course” exception to our rule against review of orders 
denying sua sponte reopening requests, a petitioner must 
establish that the BIA has limited its discretion via a policy, 
rule, settled course of adjudication, or by some other method, 
such that the BIA’s discretion can be meaningfully reviewed 
for abuse.  The petitioner’s showing must be persuasive 
enough to allow the reasonable inference that the BIA’s 
discretion has in fact been limited.  Our evaluation of the 
authorities marshaled by the petitioner logically precedes, 
rather than follows, a finding of jurisdiction to conduct abuse-
of-discretion review—although we can of course refer to the 
BIA’s decision from which the petition arises to determine 
whether it fits into the pattern alleged by the petitioner.  This 
framework follows from our reasoning in Calle-Vujiles: 
agency discretion that has been limited is reviewable and is 
thus within our jurisdiction.38   
The key words in the above formulation are 
“meaningfully” and “reasonable.”  A policy so broad as to 
merely redirect the BIA’s discretion, rather than limit it, will 
probably be insufficient.  The same goes for a “pattern” of 
dispositions whose contours are not clearly defined or which 
is not tailored to the petitioner’s circumstances.   
What happens after the petitioner has made this 
                                                 
38 Cf. Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 474.  
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showing will depend on the circumstances of the particular 
case.  We generally act, as we did in Cruz, as a final set of 
eyes.  We ensure that the BIA has not incorrectly denied 
reopening to an alien who would ordinarily be entitled to it 
under the regular course of action, which might happen if the 
BIA overlooks the core of the alien’s claim.  This holds 
particularly true when the BIA has not explained the decision 
the petitioner seeks to challenge.   
The government argues that to the extent BIA 
decisions can establish a policy, practice, or settled course of 
adjudication, only published, precedential BIA decisions 
should be considered.  It is true that we assigned diminished 
weight to the legal reasoning in and the deference owed to 
unpublished BIA decisions.39  But otherwise, on review, we 
treat the published and unpublished dispositions of the agency 
in the same way.  Moreover, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act does not distinguish between the two kinds of BIA 
orders, and their effects do not meaningfully differ for the 
affected aliens.40  There is no apparent administrative-law 
principle that removes unpublished, nonprecedential agency 
decisions from the reach of review for arbitrariness. 
Moreover, both Cruz and Chehazeh suggested that the 
BIA’s nonprecedential opinions have value in determining the 
agency’s policies and practices.  In Cruz, we used the BIA’s 
nonprecedential decisions (which had not been relied upon by 
the petitioner) to note the possible existence of a broader 
                                                 
39 De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 350 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
40 Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (setting out scope and standard of 
review). 
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policy that, while not established by those decisions, was 
nevertheless being consistently interpreted or followed by 
them.41  In Chehazeh we explained the difference between 
decisions denying reopening versus decisions granting 
reopening: the latter, whether published or unpublished, 
marked the boundaries of what the BIA considers to be 
“extraordinary” situations or circumstances warranting 
reopening.42  And, outside of the context of sua sponte 
reopening, at least one other Court of Appeals has considered 
the agency’s unpublished dispositions in determining the 
breadth of its settled course of adjudication.43    
III. Analysis 
 a) Park’s Petition for Review under the Settled Course 
Framework 
Having clarified our framework for review of Park’s 
settled course claim, we ask whether he has allowed us to 
infer that the BIA has, in fact, constrained its discretion such 
that we may meaningfully review its decision for abuse.  Park 
contends that the BIA has a “practice or pattern of reopening 
cases sua sponte where, as here, the petitioner becomes 
eligible for [] relief from removal for which he was not 
eligible in the original removal proceedings.”44   
We disagree with his premise.  Of the decisions Park 
relies upon, only one strikes us as tailored appropriately to his 
situation: an order granting sua sponte reopening because the 
                                                 
41 See Cruz, 452 F.3d at 246 n.3.   
42 See Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 128–29.   
43 See De Leon v. Holder, 761 F.3d 336, 344 (4th Cir. 2014). 
44 Park Br. 24.   
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alien was now eligible for adjustment of status based on her 
marriage to a United States citizen.45  But one favorable 
exercise of discretion does not a settled course make.  
Moreover, our independent investigation does not reveal 
obvious consistency by the BIA in this area of its case law.46     
In light of the above, Park has failed to show a 
meaningful restriction of the BIA’s discretion with regard to 
similarly situated aliens.  Without a reasonable inference of 
such a limitation, we lack jurisdiction over the petition for 
review. 
 b) Chehazeh and Cruz Do Not Grant Jurisdiction over 
Orders Denying Reopening for a Lack of 
Exceptional Circumstances 
In the alternative, Park contends that our decisions in 
Cruz and Chehazeh broadened our jurisdiction to encompass 
any decision where, as here, the BIA denies sua sponte 
reopening because exceptional circumstances/situations are 
absent.47  He refers to a passage in Cruz, referenced in 
Chehazeh, where we wrote: 
                                                 
45 In re Shulum, A73 549 194, 2003 WL 23270059, at *1 
(BIA Oct. 22, 2003).   
46 See, e.g., In re Patel, A096 441 533, 2012 WL 1495503, at 
*1 (BIA Apr. 3, 2012) (denying sua sponte reopening in 
similar situation). 
47 As the government points out, Park is not the first 
petitioner to premise a jurisdictional argument on this 
language.  See Gov’t Br. 22–23 (discussing our unpublished, 
per curiam opinion in Jabateh v. Att’y Gen., 431 F. App’x 90 
(3d Cir. 2011), which rejected a similar argument). 
19 
 
We cannot tell from its opinion whether the 
BIA concluded that Cruz made out a prima 
facie case for sua sponte relief based on his 
vacated conviction, but nevertheless exercised 
its unreviewable discretion under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(a) to decline to reopen, or whether it 
believed that Cruz had not shown an 
“exceptional situation,” and was therefore 
ineligible because he failed to establish a prima 
facie case for sua sponte relief.  In the latter 
instance, we would have jurisdiction to review 
the BIA’s decision.48 
If Park correctly reads Cruz and Chehazeh, those cases would 
amount to an almost wholesale inversion of our normal rule 
against review, because the BIA’s common refrain in denying 
reopening is that the petitioner has failed to show exceptional 
circumstances.   
Unsurprisingly, we do not think Cruz and Chehazeh 
brought about such a sweeping and unannounced change in 
our jurisprudence.  For one, despite relying on the language 
from Cruz quoted above, Chehazeh made plain the distinction 
between BIA orders denying sua sponte reopening for lack of 
exceptional circumstances (unreviewable) and those granting 
them (reviewable).49  For another, our discussion of 
exceptional circumstances in Cruz was tethered to a specific 
kind of “prima facie” case: a showing that an alien was no 
longer removable and thus had demonstrated his prima facie 
eligibility for relief from the underlying order of removal, as 
                                                 
48 Cruz, 452 F.3d at 250 (emphasis added); see also 
Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 130 (quoting Cruz).  
49 See Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 129–30.  
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opposed to a showing of potential merit on a renewed or new 
application for relief.50  Neither Cruz nor Chehazeh grants us 
jurisdiction simply because the BIA invoked a lack of 
exceptional circumstances in denying a motion to sua sponte 
reopen.51 
IV. Conclusion 
We hold that the “settled course” exception to our rule 
                                                 
50 See Cruz, 452 F.3d at 249. 
51 Park suggests two final routes through which we might find 
jurisdiction.  They merit brief discussion.   
 
First, Park appears to invoke the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015), as an independent 
ground through which we have jurisdiction.  He misreads 
Mata, which held in part that when the BIA denies a motion 
to reopen on both reviewable and non-reviewable grounds, 
courts should retain jurisdiction over the former even if the 
latter are beyond their reach.  See id. at 2155.  Since Park 
challenged only the denial of sua sponte relief in his opening 
brief, this distinction is irrelevant.   
 
Second, while Park cursorily raises a due process claim in the 
introductory sections of his brief and then again in his 
argument summary, it is presented in the body of the 
argument as an abuse-of-discretion claim.  To the extent that 
a constitutional claim of this sort could independently confer 
jurisdiction through 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)—the 
government argues that it cannot, see Gov’t Br. 28 n.4—the 
claim here is not colorable.  See Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 
F.3d 180, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that review is 
limited to colorable constitutional and legal claims). 
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against review of BIA orders denying sua sponte reopening 
can be invoked by showing that the BIA has meaningfully 
limited its discretion so as to allow our review.  The 
unpublished BIA cases cited by Park do not lead to the 
reasonable inference that the BIA has done so here.  For these 
and other reasons, we lack jurisdiction over Park’s petition 
for review.  It will be dismissed. 
